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April 5, 1973

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
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!fi A m&nent I shAll Yield tO the dis- \
tlngutshed majority leader, but before
d
so, I ask that the clerk read ~the
ding amendment.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will read the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
At the end of the bUl, Insert the following:
No tunda made avallable by the Congresa
to any department or agency of. the Government may be obligated or expended for tbe
purpose of providing assistance of any kind,
directly or Indirectly, to or on behalf of
North Vietnam, unless specltlcally authorIzed hereafter by the COngress.

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia.
Mr. President, I shall support the
pending amendment, because it is in
line with the statement made by Dr.
Henry Kissinger when he met with a
group of Senators in this building after
his return in January, I believe, and it is
in line with statements made by the
President of the United States, to wit,
that before any action was taken. the
administration would present to Congre$11 any proposal which had been
tentatively agreed to or which was under the most serious consideration at
that time.
But, Mr. President, in accepting or rejecting tne amendment, we will not dispose of the question .of aid to North
Vietnam or, indeed, to all of Indochina.
That question will at:ise and arise again
in the Senate until it is faced on the
merits of the issue. That is as it should
be; and that is as it will be. So. I want to
set forth my position at this time on the
substance of the question.
I have already expressed my full support of the President's negotiating effort which has brought about a tentative
cease-fire in· Vietnam and Laos, a withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam, and
the return of the prisoners of war. As an
essential of the success of those negotiations, the President asked for an invest-

86718

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD...:._ SENATE

ment in peace. A part of that investment, as be made clear, Is in the form
of aid in the reconstruction of the war's
bavocthrougboutlndoc~.

There are those who are against that
aid, who would find fault with the President's proposal. There Is, in particular, a
reluctance to go along with his proposal to provide postwar assistance to
North Vietnam. It Is an understandable
reluctance. Feelings run strong now, as
they did with regard to Germany and
Japan at the end of World War n and
as they do at the end of every war. Feelings aside, th~ fact remains, Mr. President, that we paid a terrible price, in a
futile effort to fight this war to an end:
303,000 Americans wounded in combat,
almost 46,000 Americans kllled in combat, 10,300 Americans dead as a result of
nonhostile action. overall 360,000 American casualties, including more than
25,000 paraplegics, quadriplegics, or disassembled men as they have been called.
The monetary cost? We have spent between $130 and $140 billion to date; the
eventual full cost may be expected to go
to $450 billion and to saddle the people
of this Nation with debts well into the
next century. Moreover, what of the divisions produced by the war at home? The
drug infestation? The lnfiatton? The
dwindling value of the dollar? The decline in respect for our political institutions?
Those are some of the costs attributable to the war, and tf we can bear them.
it seems to me, Mr. President, that we
can and should bear part of the more
nominal and constructive costs of healing the wounds of Indochina. There, too,
in all parts of that war-tom area. the
suffering has been real and overwhelming: Hundreds of thousands of men. women and children killed and maimed;
vast areas of forest and croplands reduced to deserts; thousands of cities,
towns and hamlets leveled; millions made
homeless.
Peace is healing. Peace Is the putting
aside of anger. Peace Is reconstructing
and building. So on February 27, I expressed the hope and desire to cooperate
with the President of the United States
in his efforts to embark on a decade of
peace, the first step of which would be
the negotiated end of the war in Indochina. I indicated at that time that I
would support his proposals for peace
even though they involved postwar aid to
all of Indochina. I offered that support,
however, subject to various criteria
which I was then trying to delineate in
my own mind. One of those criteria, Mr.
President, Is now clear to me and it Is
best that it be set forth at this time.
I am inclined to support the President's position on Indochina, provided,
in the first place, that a cease-fire Is, in
fact, reasonably operative throughout
Indochina and we are militarily out of
that situation lock, stock, and barrel. It
is with regret, therefore, that I note that
such is not the situation today. Where Is
the peace? Where is the disengagement?
How can we speak of rebuilding when
B-52 bombers, day after day, are still
making some of the heaviest bombing
runs of the war? When we continue to
face the prospect of more casualties,
more POW's and more MIA's?

Where is this transpiring, Mr. President? In Cambodia, of all places. Cambodia, never was more than vaguely
peripheral to the confiict in Vietnam
and only by a great stretch of reason
could tt be connected with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. The
lli-fated excursion acr06S the Cambodian
borders 3 years ago had no discernible effect on the outcome of the conflict
other than to add greatly to our costs
and casualties and saddle us with st1ll
another dependent government. Cambodia's internal political situation never
was and is not now remotely connected
with any reasonable interest of the people of the United States.
Yet, here we are at this late date digging ourselves deeper into another tragic
military involvement, in.tllcting one more
vast compass of devastation on one more
hapless land. in support of one more irrelevant government, in one more obscure region of Indochina. In my judgment, to continue to pursue this vein is
to cast into doubt all that has been
achieved by way of negotiation in Vietnam.

So, Mr. President, I reiterate my inclination to support the President's position. which is a valid one in my judgment, as a measure of decency, as a share
of our responsibility for developing international peace, and as a contribution
to the healing of the wounds of a terrible
war. But I cannot and I will not vote for
funds for reconstruction in North Vietnam or South Vietnam or wherever in
Indochina tf we continue to put out great
sums to pay for continual bombing runs
over Cambodia which risk the ruin of
more American lives. Unless this lastgasp practice ends forthwith, the war
in Indochina will not be ended. In the
circumstances, I can see little point in
supporting any aid program for any part
of Indochina.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Will the Senator
from Montana yield briefly?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed.
Mr. PROXMIRE. May I ask the majority leader if, by his speech, in which
be places a series of conditions on his
support for aid to North Vietnam, i f - Mr. MANSFIELD. To Indochina.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Indoc~. that Is
right-not only North Vietnam, South
Vietnam. but any aid to Indochina--if
he feels that the Byrd amendment as
modified, and as such is dramatically
improved, would not receive his support?
As the amendment reads now, aid to
North Vietnam shall be prohibited unless specifically authorized hereafter by
Congress.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have indicated my
full support for the Byrd amendment as
modified, because it is strengthening and
recognizes the responsibility of Congress.
It fits in very well with what Dr. Henry
Kissinger told us when he met with
Senators in this part of the Capitol in
late January, at which time he said that
any proposals which would be forthcojJling would first be sent to Congress
for consideration, discussion, debate,
and approval or disapproval. The President of the United States has said the
same thin&'. w:pat we are doing Is based
on what has been said befo~,-_but put-
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ting it down in the form of an amendment which will have the effect of law.
Mr. PROXMIRE. If the Senator will
yield a little further, let me say I am delighted to hear this. Earlier, I bad saidbut I was misinformed-that I understood the majority leader would move to
table the Byrd amendment. That statement of mine was in error and I am
happy that it was. I now understand that
the distinguished majority leader will
support the Byrd amendment.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes indeed.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. !yield.
Mr. TOWER. I might note that not
only did Dr. Kissinger and the President
both say they expected to get the authorization of Congress for any such proposals, but they made it clear to North
Vietnam at Paris that Congress approval
would have to be forthcoming.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. I think the
communique by Presidents Thteu and
Nixon at San Clemente the evening before last said in effect-! will have to
paraphrase it freeiy-oomething to the
effect that each President would have to
take this matter up with their respective
congresses.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the
text of the statement I made in the Senate on this subject on February 27, 1973.
There being no objection the statement was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as fOllOWS:
Mr. MANsFIELD. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Vermont !or the temperate statement be has
made today, which fits In with h1s call for
bipartisanship several days ago.
I note that on page 6 of his speech the
Senator states:
"The cea.se-tlre Is only the bare beginnings
ot peace In Indochina."
How true. And j ust how tenuous that
cea.se-flre Is, of course, Is ma.nl!est In the
fact that In South VIetnam, In Cambodia.,
e.nd In La.os the fighting Is still going on.
So I co=end the distinguished Senator
for his remarks, becaUS& what he doeS' Is to
ra.1se a. fiag of ca.ution. What he Is primarily
Interested In, as I a.m--a.nd I am sure the
entire Senate e.nd the total American population-Is three things: One, a. cease-fire In
fact as well as In being; two, the continued
withdrawal of a.U U.S. military personnel
from VIetnam, a. process which Is In operation
a.t the present tlme--a.nd It Is my understanding that the number remaining at the
moment Is somewhere between 11,000 and
12,0()()--e.nd, three, the return of our POW's
and the recoverable missing In action.
Those are the three most Important !actors. When we reach those objectives, then
I think we can begin talking about assistance, It any such proposal Is made, under
article XXI o! the agreement. But I think
that In the meantime we ought to give the
man downtown-the President--a chance to
work these things through, following this
tentative settlement--and that Is all It Is
at the moment. We must try to make certain
that there will not be a return to warfare
In which we will become engaged and that
there Is an opportunity to establish a basts
for a peace In that part of the world not only
for the Indigenous peoples concerned but
for this Nation as well.
The distinguished Senator says on page 7
of his speech:
"There will be plenty of room for debate
and discussion over the form that the reconstniCtlon presence In Indochina shou ld take."
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Again. the Senator Is correct. There will be
a Tight time for a. proposal to be made. based
on the circumstances which exist at that
time. Those circumstances. to get bnck to
what originally was said. depend on a ceasefire In fact. depend on the total withdrawal
of all U.S. military personnel nnd the release
of all prisoners of war and recoverable missin~

in action.

As the distinguis hed Sen;,._or s a ys in his
sprech:
..But the purpose will be to discourage
more war and to enronrBge more peace ··
The Senator is Tight. I hope that his speech
has been Ustene<). to and will be read by those
who are Interested 1n that part of the world
and our role 1n It and that they will be aware
of the fact that the war Is not over; that
there is only a tenuous truce; that we stU!
have POW"s and recoverable MTA"s 1n North
and south Vietnam. 1n Cambodia. and 1n
Laos; that we still have between 11.000 and
12.000 military personnel to be withdrawn.
and that the truce at the moment Is at best
delicate; It is far from being a. cease-fire. 1n
!act.
I would hope we would follow the advice
of the distinguished Senator from Vermont;
that we would withhold our own fire !or the
moment, at least, and give the President a
chance. based on the facts as they exist and
in accord with what I have stated this afternoon, to present to the Congress a proposal, a
proposal which I am sure Congress will disect
and go into thoroughly. and a proposal on
which Congress Itself will have to make a
judgment. as well as the President.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President. I take this time
to thank the majority leader for the remarks
he has made and to state that I do not regard the Parts conference as even being a
near approach to Utopia. There will be problems and violations of the agreement which
has been reached. b u t we have made one
step and I want to make plain that we cannot consider seriously any expenditures for
reconstruction. and so forth. untll all of
our prisoners of war have been released.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I am in accord with the views just expressed by the distinguished Senator. As he knows. for years
I have had three objectives, which I have
mentioned and which I cannot reiterate too
often. I have sought for years to bring about
a. ceasefire. not only In VIetnam. but In all or
Indochina. I have sought !or years to bring
about the extrication of our forces from Vietnam and Indochina. I have sought for years
to bring about the release o! the prisoners
o! war and the missing In action.
These objectives seem-and I emphasize
the word "'seem"'-to be on the way to a final
solution, which may well be contingent on
the ""investment 1n peace•• 1n all o~ Indochina. What the President said about an
'"Investment In peace' " may well be part of
the price of ending this ghastly war. an objective so much desired by all of us and paid
for over such a long period or time by over
303.000 Americans wounded 1n combat. by
almost 46.000 Americans k111ed In combat, by
10.300 Americans dead as the result of nonhostile action. by an overall total of almost
360.000 American casualties in this war.
Co:1current with that human cost Is the
monetary cost of between $130 billion and
$140 billion to date. a cost which will eventually amou:rft to between $350 b111ion and
$450 billion. and which will SAddle the people o! this Nation well into the next century.
It Is good. Indeed, that at long last this
longest. most tragic and second most costly
war In all our history may be coming to an
end. In the words o! Dr Kissinger. 1n his
superb exposition at his press conference 1n
mid-January. ·It Is time that ""Together with
healing the wounds of Indochina. we can
begin to heal the wounds or America."'
Subject to various criteria which I am
working on at the present time, I think we

ought to give the Presldent"s proposals.
when and u they come up, every reasonable
consideration. because our cblef objeet1ve. as
I am sure It Is bis. Is to bring about. finally.
pPace and stability In Indochina. It would be
our hope and desire to cooperate with the
President of the United States 1n his etrorts
to embark on the ..decade or pta.ce" which
he has stressed so often during this administration.

I thank the distinguished Senator.
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